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NOTES
TORTS-FEDERAL PROCEDURE-IMPLEADING THE UNITED
STATES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT. The United
States Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, recently decided that
under the Federal Tort Claims Act' individual defendants, charged
with negligence, can implead the United States as a third-party defendant and can join the United States for purposes of contribution
among joint tort-feasors under circumstances in which plaintiff's
injury was caused by the negligence of individual defendants and
that of an employee of the United States government then acting
within the scope of his employment. The FTCA, in its original
form, authorized suit by an injured party for "any claim against the
United States . . . on account of personal injury".! The decision here
considered resolves two cases from different circuits, U. S. v. Yellow
Cab Co. from the Third Circuit and Capital Transit Co. v. U. S. from
the District of Columbia Circuit; this decision will be referred to
hereafter as the Yellow Cab decision.' The former case, U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., arose in Pennsylvania and resulted from the initial
action of Howey v. Yellow Cab Co.,' in which the United States
District Court, by adopting a broad interpretation of the FTCA,
allowed impleading of the United States as a third-party defendant
and denied the government motion to dismiss the suit against it. The
government, having been unsuccessful in appealing the adverse ruling
to the Third Circuit' on the ground that under the FTCA it had not
consented to be sued through joinder and impleader, the United
States Supreme Court, likewise, refused the argument of the government and upheld the Third Circuit by affirming the ruling authorizing
joinder and impleader. The latter case, Capital Transit Co. v. U. S.,
arose in the District of Columbia and resulted from the initial action
of Stradley v. Capital Transit Co.' Acting under the FTCA, Capital
Transit moved to implead the United States as a third-party defendant, but the United States District Court denied the motion by
interpreting the Act strictly in order to protect the government's
2 60 Stat. 842, 28 U. S. C. (1946, ed.) §§921-946. Hereafter cited in the
text as FTCA. As amended, 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed. Supp. III) §§1291,
1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680.
With the revision of the Judicial Code under the Act of June 25, 1948,
the FTCA of 1946 was repealed (see Schedule of Laws Repealed, 62 Stat.
1008), but the subject matter was reenacted into law, with slight change,
under Title 28'of the U. S. Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, ef,
fective Sept. 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, and all sections of the original act
were renumbered. See Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act - A Statu
tory Interpretation, 35 Geo. L. J. 1 (1946); Yankwich, Problems Under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143 (1950); Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale L. J. 534 (1947).
60 Stat. 844, 28 U.S. C. (1946 ed.) §931(a) (emphasis added). See
28 U.S. C. (1946 ed. Supp. III)§1346(b) for revised wording, which
reads, in part, "'The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions on claims against the United States for . . . personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act o# omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment." (Emphasis added).
3
U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co. and Capital Transit Co. v. U. S. 71 Sup. Ct.
399 (1951).
4 No report of opinion of United States District, E.D.Pa., was published.
5 Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. granted 71
Sup. Ct. 63 (1950); Note, 50 Col. L. Rev. 1137 (1950) 59 Yale L. J.
1515 (1950).
G Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94, 95 (D.C. 1949); Note,
35 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1949).
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sovereign right to immunity from suit in tort without its consent.
Though the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision,' the
United States Supreme Court reversed the holding, stating that the
FTCA must be applied on a broad, liberal basis.
In the Stradley cas& plaintiff was injured while a passenger on
a streetcar which collided with a United States Army truck operated
by a soldier acting within the scope of his employment. Alleging
that his injury resulted from the negligence of defendant's conductor,
plaintiff sued the Transit company, which, in turn moved to make
the United States a third-party defendant on the ground that the
negligent operation of the Army truck by the soldier-driver was the
sole or contributing cause of the collision. Upon the granting of the
Transit's company motion, the United States was joined as a thirdparty defendant. The United' States moved for dismissal of suit
against it on the ground that the United States cannot be sued without
its consent and that the FTCA. does not expressly authorize joinder
or impleader of the United States for purposes of contribution among
joint tort-feasors. The court granted this motion and the suit against
the United States was dismissed. The Transit company, having been
found guilty of negligence, prosecuted an unsuccessful appeal in the
District of Columbia Circuit to hold the United States for contribution as a joint tort-feasor, but the United States Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court and by the Yellow Cab decision said, in
effect, that under the FTCA Capital Transit had a right to join and
implead'the
United States as a third-party defendant. In the Howey
case9 defendant Yellow Cab Company was permitted to implead the
United States, and when both defendants were found guilty of negligence under the applicable Pennsylvania law, the United States
District Court ordered the United States to pay half the damages by
way of contribution.'
In the Yellow Cab decision the United States Supreme Court,
mindful of Judge Cardozo's caveat against "refinement of construction",0 refused to construe the FTCA strictly, as has been its custom
heretofore with other statutes and cases where the government's
interests were in question.' The United States has long recognized
its obligation to grant relief in tort claims arising out of the negligent conduct of its employees but has granted this relief only
Capital Transit Co. v.U. S., 183 F.2d 825 (D.C.Cir. 1950), cert. granted
71 Sup. Ct. 61 (1950); Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1515 (1950); 26 Notre Dame
O

20

Law. 349 (1951); 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 714 (1951).
Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94 (D.C. 1949).
See supra n. 4 and n. 5.
12 Purdon's Penna. Stats., §2081.
Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1950).
Anderson v. Hayes ConstructiorV Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28,
29 (1926), quoted in U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 403
(1951).
U. S. v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941) (non-joinder in contract suit);
U. S. v. Michel, 282 U. S. 656 (1931) (tax recovery suit); Price v. U. S.,
174 U. S. 373 (1899) (damage by ward of government); Schillinger v.
U. S., 155 U. S. 163 (1894) (patent appropriated by U. S.). Contra,
Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S.
81, 84 (1941), wherein it reads, "Waivers by Congress of governmental
immunity from suit should be liberally construed in the case of federal
instrumentalities-that being in line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity"; South Carolina Highway Department v.
U. S., 78 F. Supp. 594, 596 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
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through private bills." With the passage of the FTCA in 1946
Congress sought to relieve itself of this legislative burden of numerous private relief bills.' and it clearly declared the government's
liability for the negligent conduct of its employees "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant for such damage, loss, or injury, or death in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred"."
Twelve specifically enumerated exceptions were not to be covered
by the Act ' and nothing therein prohibits joinder or impleader of
the United States for purposes of contribution among joint tortfeasors. There was a definite split of opinion in the cases under the
FTCA on this subject of joinder' and the courts which granted
joinder applied the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
and thus gave a broad, literal interpretation to the statute." It was
provided, further, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
govern the practice and procedure
under the Act." These rules
permit third-party practice, 1 necessary2 and permissive" joinder of
parties. No one will deny the government's right to implead others
for purposes of contribution; yet if the statute were construed strictly
as proposed by government counsel, the United States would be
14

25

14
1,
is

22

=

Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 757, 799
(1927); Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
1 (1933); Holtzoff, Tort Claims Against the United States, 25 A.B.A.J.
828 (1939); Buford, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 20 Miss. L. J. 354
(1949); Yankwich, Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9
F.R.D. 143 (1950).
Moore, Federal Tort Claims Act, 33 A.B.A.J. 857, 8'8 (1947), writes,
"The magnitude of private claim bills introduced in Congress has been
prodigious. The Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses each considered more than 2,300 private claim bills asking for a total of over
$106,000,000. Approximately 2,000 private bills were introduced in
the Seventysixth Congress, which approved 315 of them for a total of
$826,000". See Hulen, Suits on Tort Claims Against the United States,
7 F.R.D. 689, 690 (1948).
28 U. S. C. §1346(b).
28 U. S. C. §2680.
For over fifty years, in suits under the Tucker Act of 1887, the United
States Supreme Court has not permitted joinder of individuals with the
United States as co-defendants. See 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 113 (1950).
Cases granting joinder: Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 187 F. 2d 967 (3d
Cir. 1950); State of Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83
F. Supp. 91 (D.Md. 1949); Englehardt v. U.S., 69 F. Supp. 471 .(D.
Md. 1947); Bullock v. U. S., 72 F. Supp. 445 (DN.J. 1947).
Cases denying joinder: Capital Transit Co. v. U. S., 183 F.2d 825 (D.C.
Cir. 1950); Sappington v. Barrett, 182 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir. 1950);
Prechtl v. U. S., 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.N.Y. 1949); Donovan v.
McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D.Mass. 1948); Uarte v. U. S., 7 F.R.D.
705 (S.D.Calif. 1948); Drummond v. U. S., 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D.Va.
1948).
Wojciuk v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.Wis. 1947). But see U. S.
v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), at 844, "The maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius is by no means a rule of statutory interpretation to be universally applied". See also Cascade County, Montana v.
U. S.,75 F. Supp. 850, 853 (D.Mont. 1948).
60 Stat. §411 (1946).
Fed. R. Civ. P., 14(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P., 19(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P., 20(a).
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granted immunity not only from being impleaded by another defendant but also from having to pay contribution for negligence of
its own employees.
Favoring the broad, literal interpretation,
authorizing both joinder and impleader of the United States for
contribution, the United States Supreme Court says, "It is fair that
this should work both ways".'
Contribution is "the right of one who has discharged a common
liability or burden to recover of another also liable the aliquot
portion which he ought to pay or bear".'
Historically, the rule is
that contribution among joint tort-feasors is not recognized' for the
reason that "no man can make his own misconduct the ground for
an action in his own favor".27 Contribution is not founded on contract,' nor does it sound in tort;' it originated in equity" and is now
enforced at law." Therefore, the courts denying joinder and contribution in cases under the FTCA" had the support of tradition, but
there appear to be sound reasons why this rule should be discarded.
Bohlen has suggested" three such reasons: (1) denial of contribution
cannot be an effective deterrent to wrongdoing; (2) because the
forum of the court is granted to a negligent plaintiff seeking damages, it should be granted also to one seeking contribution from a
co-delinquent; and (3) though it is said that the law has no scales to
determine relative guilt, still by analogy with the provisions of the
Federal, Employers' Liability Act,' it is believed a proper and satisfactory determination of degree of guilt could be made. "The denial
of contribution and the concept of tort liability upon which that
denial is itself founded have greatly handicapped the intelligent
development of the law of torts, and particularly of the law of
negligence."'
Prosser says, "There is obvious lack of sense and
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which
two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be
shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful
levy of execution, the plaintiff's whim or malevolence, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free".' The
U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 71, Sup. Ct. 399, 405 (1951).
18 C.J.S. §1 (1939).
Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186 (K.B. 1799) (plaintiff who had
responded in damages to a third person sued on implied assumpsit but
was refused damages from a defendant with whom plaintiff was in pari
delicto). See Restatement, Restitution §102 (1937); Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts, 1111 (1941); Reath, Contribution Between Persons
Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 Harv. L.
Rev. 176 (1898). Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130 (1932), at 139, states, "There has
been a great deal of criticism of the common law rule denying contribution
between tort-feasors, but practically all of it has been against the rule
as applied in negligence cases." See also James, Contribution Among
joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941).
27 1 Cooley, Torts, 291 (4th ed. 1932).
28 2 Williston, Contracts, §345 (Rev. ed. 1936).
2 Brown 6? Root v. U. S., 92 F. Supp. 257, 261 (S.D.Texas 1950).
5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, §§2334, 2338 (4th ed. 1919).
"
Goldman v. MitchellFletcher Co., 292 Pa. 54, 141 At. 231 (1928);
Note, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 979 (1928).
32
See cases cited supra, n. 18.
33
Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 Corn. L. Q.
552, 557 et seq. (1936).
45 U. S. C. A. §53 (1928).
"
Bohlen, op. cit., 553.
Prosser, Torts, 1114 (1941).
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Yellow Cab decision to permit impleading of the United States as a
third-party for purposes of contribution is a decisive and progressive
step in contributing materially to what Bohlen called "the intelligent
development of the law of torts".
Formerly, waiver of sovereign immunity in tort liability was
consistently upheld and courts construed statutes strictly on all points
where the government's position was being subjected to direct attack.
Under the FTCA those courts which denied joinder and impleader
zealously maintained this precedent of strict interpretation of waiver
of immunity with respect to the United States, in spite of the
undoubted clarity and directness of the language of the Act. By the
very wording of the FTCA Congress manifestly intended a change
from this historic position of sovereign immunity; thus the Yellow
Cab decision is correct in its interpretation of the Act, even though
such an interpretation marks a complete break from the former rule
of strict construction of a statute pertaining to the tort liability of
the United States. In fact, the words "any claim" indicate clearly
the intent of Congress to be as the United States Supreme Court has
here decided.
There are admitted procedural problems under the FTCA, but
these do not appear insuperable. For example, exclusive original
jurisdiction for a civil action on a tort claim, having been given to
federal district courts," the Act provides that the courts shall try
without a jury any case in which the United States is a defendant."
If joinder be permitted, the one party-defendant, a private person,
is entitled under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution to a trial
by jury. The situation then is one in which the case of the United
States, is tried to the court, while that of the other party-defendant
is tried to the jury. Indeed, the case of Englehardt v. U. S.," one
of the leading cases under the FTCA, was tried in this manner. If
after proceeding with a trial both to the court and to the jury it
appears that separate trials for the parties-defendant be deemed
advisable, the court under Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is empowered to order same. The problem of variance in
verdicts in respect to parties-defendant under joinder is not obviated
by separate trials. Another procedural problem is that of appellate
review. The FTCA provides for appeal to be taken either to the
Court of Appeals or to the Court of Claims. ' Appeal to the latter
can be accomplished only with "the written consent on behalf of
all the appellees".'
The arguments advanced against joinder and
impleader based on procedural points are, for the most part, cogent
and compelling, theoretically, at least, but the United States Supreme
Court boldly and realistically decided that under the FTCA Congress
unquestionably intended that the United States waive its sovereign
immunity broadly in tort claims and that therefore the FTCA does
authorize third-party procedure and does carry the government's
consent to be sued because the Act was "intended to facilitate, not
to preclude, the trial of multiple claims which otherwise would be
2
triable only in separate proceedings"."
Even with the protection which the Yellow Cab holding gives
to all interested parties, there are still some inequities for litigants
37
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U. S. C. §1346(a).
U. S. C. §2402.
F. Supp. 451 (D.Md. 1947).
U. S. C. §§1291. 1504.
U. S. C. §1504.
S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 407 (1951).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in a suit brought under the FTCA. An injured plaintiff may bring suit
in one of two jurisdictions, either where he resides or where the
accident occurred." The FTCA is administered in accordance with
"the law of the place where the act or omission occurred".'
Thus,
litigants denied joinder and impleader in one jurisdiction, because
the local law did not permit such rights, could have been granted
these procedural rights, had their case been prosecuted in another
jurisdiction in which the local law did permit such procedure. The
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act" has been adopted by
six states, Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
and South Dakota, and by Hawaii," and twelve other states and
Puerto Rico have statutes permitting contribution." An additional
twelve states permit contribution by judicial decision." The Maryland
statute of 1941" controlled the Englehardt case, while Pennsylvania
law, authorizing contribution,' applied in the Howey case.
One need not fear that a broad, literal interpretation of the
FTCA will lead to harmful or undesirable results. Three states, for
example, Illinois, Michigan, and New York, having waived sovereign
immunity in tort liability in varying degrees, have provided for
judicial administration of tort claims before a Court of Claims. 1 The
New York act, the most liberal, allowing unlimited recovery, constitutes a broad2 waiver of immunity, and in operation has proved
most successful.
There is every reason to believe that waiver of
sovereign immunity by the United States may be equally successful
and really prove a new, vital force for justice and equity. The Yellow
Cab decision represents an interpretation of the FTCA according to
its "broad language" and is a decided advance in the field of torts.
The age-old doctrine of sovereign immunity, that "the king can do
no wrong", has rightly become a veritable museum-piece in our legal
thinking.
Frederick E. Martin
43
"
45
46
47

28 U. S. C. §1402(b).
28 U. S. C. §§2672, 2674.
9 U. L. A. 159 (1942).
9 U. L. A. Supp. 32 (1950).
Gottlieb, Some Aspects of Contribution and Indemnity in Tort Actions
Against the United States, 9 Federal Bar Journal 391, 397 (1948).
Id. at 398 et seq.
49 Maryland Code (Flack, 1943, Supp.) Art. 50 §§21.30.
See supra, n. 8.
5 Borchard,, Tort Claims Against Government: Municipal, State and
Federal Liability, 33 A.B.A.J. 221, 225 (1947).
"2
Ibid.

